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APPLYING MURPHY BROS. V. MICHETTI PIPE
STRINGING, INC. TO REMOVAL IN
MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
I. INTRODUCTION
Sections 14411 and 14462 of the Judicial Code were enacted to
allow defendants to remove a federal claim from state court to fed-
eral court. Congress "seem[ed] to believe that the defendant's right
to remove a case ... is at least as important as the plaintiff's right to
the forum of his choice." 3 While the plaintiff has the right to choose
the initial forum, § 1446 provides the defendant with an opportunity
to remove a claim with proper federal jurisdiction to a federal court.
This statutory right protects the defendant from any unfairness a state
forum may create, such as local state prejudice. 4 As such, the re-
moval statute's purpose is and always has been focused on fairness
and equity of forum choice to all parties.
Section 1446(b) grants the defendant a thirty-day time limitation
for removal. The wording of § 1446(b), however, has caused confu-
sion over the years and has resulted in a sharp split among courts as
to when the thirty-day limitation begins.5 A recent Supreme Court
case, Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,6 clarified the is-
sue of removal in single-defendant suits, but there is still a
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
2. Id. § 1446.
3. McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992).
4. See Ehrlich v. Oxford Ins. Co., 700 F. Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
5. See Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 841-42 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the thirty-day limitation begins with even a "courtesy copy" of the
complaint, rather than official service of process); cf Bowman v. Weeks Ma-
rine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329, 333 (D.S.C. 1996) (holding that removal begins
only upon official service of process).
6. 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 34:323
discrepancy regarding tolling times when two or more defendants are
served on different days.7
In light of the statutory construction of § 1446(b), congressional
intent, and fairness, tolling among multiple defendants is most logi-
cally read in favor of the later-served defendants. In other words,
each defendant should be accorded thirty days in which to decide to
remove the case, starting at the time that the specific defendant con-
sidering removal is officially served.
This Comment will analyze the historical purpose of the re-
moval statute, as well as the interpretations that have surfaced among
courts. The Comment will further propose a solution to this multi-
ple-defendant discrepancy after exploring the analyses of different
circuits on this issue. Part II of this Comment will delve into the
statutory history and provisions of § 1446(b). Part III will critique
the relevant case law on this issue. It will take a closer look at the
Fifth Circuit's approach to this dilemma, as well as the analyses of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. Part IV will focus on the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Mutphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc., which has clarified single-defendant removal suits. Part V will
analyze how the problem should be corrected. Finally, Part VI will
outline a proposed solution to best conform to the statutory language,
congressional intent, and fairness to all parties.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF § 1446
Section 1441 is the general removal statute. It explains that
"any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States...."'
While § 1441 authorizes removal, § 1446 limits this procedure.
Specifically, § 1446(a) states that "[a] defendant or defendants
7. See McKinney, 955 F.2d at 924 (holding that each individual defendant
has thirty days from the time he or she is officially served); Getty Oil Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that the fail-
ure of the first-served defendant to file or consent to a notice of removal within
thirty days of service of process precludes all subsequently-served defendants
from removal)
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
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desiring to remove any civil action.., from a State court shall file
... a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together
with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such
defendant or defendants in such action."9 Section 1446(b) adds fur-
ther requirements by stating that
[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial plead-
ing setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action
or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the serv-
ice of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has then been filed in court and is not required to be served
on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.'0
Section 1446(b)'s wording has made it difficult for courts to
determine the correct removal procedure. By stating that the thirty-
day limitation period begins after "receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise,"" a myriad of interpretations have developed
as to the time the clock begins to tick. 12 Because the statute's "plain
meaning" is not clear, it is necessary to look at the congressional in-
tent behind § 1446(b)'s enactment.
13
In 1948, Congress amended § 1446(b) to state that "the petition
for removal of a civil action or proceeding may be filed within
twenty days14 after commencement of the action or service of
9. Id. § 1446(a).
10. Id. § 1446(b).
11. Id.
12. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 532
(6th Cir. 1999); Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 841-42 (5th Cir.
1996); McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992); Getty Oil
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir. 1988); Bowman v.
Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329,330 (D.S.C. 1996).
13. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 355
(1999) (stating that the Seventh Circuit's ability to read "or otherwise" differ-
ently in separate cases undermines the position that the phrase has an inevita-
ble plain meaning); see also Apache Nitrogen Prods., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co.,
145 F.R.D. 674, 679 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that if the wording had a plain
meaning, the cases would not be split over its interpretation).
14. Congress extended the period for removal from twenty days to thirty
days in 1965. See Act of September 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-215, § 1446(b),
79 Stat. 845, 887.
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process, whichever is later."' 5 Prior to this enactment, § 1446(b) al-
lowed removal to occur at any time before the defendant was re-
quired-by the laws of the state or the rule of the state court in which
such suit was brought-to answer or plead.' 6  According to the
House Report, the statute was amended to "give adequate time and
operate uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction."'
7
However, confusion, and a lack of uniformity, remained. State
civil procedure requirements for personal service varied so greatly
that vast differences in the timing of removal occurred.18 In addition,
some states did not require a copy of the complaint to be sent to the
defendant, creating even more uncertainty for the proper time limita-
tion. In 1949, Congress amended this section again, to prevent "dif-
ficulty in States, such as New York, where suit is commenced by the
service of a summons and the plaintiffs initial pleading is not re-
quired to be served or filed until later."19 Congress corrected this
dilemma by providing that a petition for removal "need not be filed
until twenty days after the defendant has received a copy of plain-
tiff's initial pleading., 20  Further, Congress noted that problems
could also arise in other states where a copy of the pleading is not re-
quired to be served to the defendant. 2' For example, in states where
only an official summons, without receipt of the pleading, is required
to commence a lawsuit, variances may also occur.
Thus, Congress clarified that the petition for removal within
these states begins to run twenty days after service of the summons.
22
Congressional hearings reinforced their intent. Congress stated that
[i]n some States suits are begun by the service of a sum-
mons or other process without the necessity of filing any
pleading until later. As the section now stands, this places
15. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939, 939, amended by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (1994).
16. See generally Raymond's, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 159 F.
Supp. 212, 214-15 (D. Mass. 1956) (discussing the 1949 revision of §
1446(b)).
17. H.R. REP. No. 80-308, atA135 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Potter v. McCauley, 186 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D. Md. 1960).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) note (1994) (1949 Act Historical and Revision
Note).
20. H.R. REP. No. 81-352, at 14 (1949).
21. See S. REP. No. 81-303, at 6 (1949).
22. See S. REP. No. 80-308, atA135 (1947).
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the defendant in the position of having to take steps to re-
move a suit to Federal court before he knows what the suit
is about. As said section is herein proposed to be rewritten,
a defendant is not required to file his petition for removal
until 20 days after he has received ... a copy of the initial
pleading filed by the plaintiff setting forth the claim upon
which the suit is based and the relief prayed for. It is be-
lieved that this will meet the varying conditions of practice
in all the States.
23
A clear reading of the statute, in light of this intent, gives rise to
four separate scenarios. In fact, almost every type of case will fall
within these scenarios. First, if a copy of the complaint is served at
the same time as the summons, the twenty-day period is deemed to
commence at this time. Second, if the complaint is served on the de-
fendant after service of process, the defendant receives twenty days
from receipt of the complaint. Third, if the state does not require that
the defendant receive a copy of the complaint, but the complaint was
filed in court prior to service of process, the defendant is afforded
twenty days after service of process. Lastly, if the service of process
occurs in a state in which a copy of the complaint to the defendant is
not required, and the complaint was not filed in court prior to service
of process, the defendant is afforded twenty days from the date the
complaint is filed in state CoUrt.
2 4
Courts, however, have read this amended statute erroneously.
25
Since Congress clarified that tolling for removal in states without a
requirement to deliver to the defendant a copy of the complaint be-
gins upon receipt of service of process, many districts interpreted the
need for service of process as required only within these specific
23. S. REP. No. 81-303, at 6.
24. See Potter v. McCauley, 186 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Md. 1960).
25. Compare Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 841 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that removal period begins with receipt of a copy of the initial
pleading through any means, not just service of process), and Roe v.
O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Once the defendant possesses
a copy of the complaint it must decide promptly in which court it wants to
proceed."), with Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329, 333
(D.S.C. 1996) (holding that removal begins only upon proper service of proc-
ess), and Baratt v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 787 F. Supp. 333, 336
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that proper service is a prerequisite to commence-
ment of removal period).
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states. This resulted in two alternative methods for computing the
tolling of the thirty-day limitation. In the first scenario, notice must
be filed within thirty days of receipt of a copy of the initial pleading,
through service or otherwise. In the second scenario, notice must be
filed within thirty days after the service of summons. If the initial
pleading has been filed in court, service to the defendant is not re-
quired.26
In the recent Supreme Court case of Murphy Bros. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc.,27 the Court clarified the statute's meaning in
relation to the first scenario. The Court stated that service of process
was still required in all states. 28 The Court found that Congress's de-
scription of tolling after receipt of the initial pleading did not infer
that service of process was not a necessary pre-requisite.29 Instead,
the Court determined that Congress's clarification for "atypical state
commencement and complaint filing procedures, [never] intended to
dispense with the historic function of service of process as the offi-
cial trigger for responsive action by an individual or entity named de-
fendant."3°
This clarification of congressional intent has aided in a better
understanding of the meaning of § 1446(b). Congress has twice
amended this statute to prevent a time variance in defendants' ability
to remove to federal court.3 In 1948, the amendment was intended
to prevent variable time allowances for a defendant to remove be-
tween different states.32 Similarly, Congress felt it was important
enough to amend a second time, again to prevent discrepancy among
timing in states where no initial pleading under state law needs to be
served.3 Thus, the congressional intent of § 1446(b) has each time
been to maintain a uniform and fair system of removal for defendants
26. See 2 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.06
(3d ed. 1999).
27. 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
28. See id. at 352-53.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 353.
31. See Raymond's Inc. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 159 F. Supp. 212,
214-15 (D. Mass. 1956).
32. See id.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 81-352, at 14 (1949).
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in state actions that could also be brought in federal courts.14 Thus,
Congress has protected the original purpose of § 1446(b), namely, to
provide each defendant with a specific amount of time to remove,
and to protect defendants against variable time allotments.
35
The problem that must now be addressed is how § 1446 should
be interpreted in multiple-defendant lawsuits. Multiple defendants
produce an even greater plethora of dilemmas: (1) If the complaint is
filed, and only the first defendant has been served, is this sufficient to
begin the thirty-day tolling for all future defendants who have not yet
been served?; (2) Does the later-served defendant's tolling time to
join in another's removal petition begin to tick on the service of the
first defendant, rather than his or her own service date?; and (3) Can
the later-served defendant initiate a petition for removal within thirty
days of his or her service, or will the rule of unanimity, discussed
below, preclude any removal after the first-served's tolling time ex-
pires, thereby thwarting the possibility for any defendant served
more than thirty days after the first to petition to remove? These
questions all stem from the confusion over whether later-served de-
fendants have any removal rights within a lawsuit. Congress's intent
behind its statutory amendments should be closely examined when
interpreting each defendant's right to remove in a multiple-defendant
lawsuit.
As mentioned above, the purpose of the congressional amend-
ments is to afford defendants with a fair, uniform amount of time to
remove.36 It is unlikely that Congress would have intended to allow
for one defendant's removal rights to be stripped based on the time
that another defendant is served by the plaintiff. In fact, serving only
one defendant and binding many others in a suit is the same type of
unfairness Congress tried to prevent in single-defendant lawsuits by
twice amending § 1446(b).
]I. THE SPLIT AMONG CIRCUIT COURTS OVER § 1446(b) AND
MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
Several circuit courts have applied the time limitation for re-
moval in multiple-defendant lawsuits differently. Specifically, the
34. See H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A135 (1947).
35. See id.
36. See id.
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Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have addressed this issue." The
analyses of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits are in agreement, and both
have developed a fair interpretation of the statute.3" The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, took a different approach.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that proper service or delivery of
the complaint to one defendant, as required by § 1446(b), was suffi-
cient to commence the tolling time for removal of every potential de-
fendant in the suit.
39
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits, however, rejected this mentality
and required that each defendant be individually afforded the proper
§ 1446(b) requirement of thirty days before their time for removal
expires. 40 Because many circuits have not yet addressed this issue, it
is important to closely scrutinize these first-impression cases and
clarify which circuit's analysis is most akin to the statute's construc-
tion, Congress's intent, and fairness to all parties.
A. The Limiting Approach of the Fifth Circuit
1. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Getty Oil
4'
The Fifth Circuit has held that removal for multiple defendants
under § 1446(b) must occur within thirty days of the first-served de-
fendant.42 Getty Oil is the Fifth Circuit's leading case on this issue.
In Getty Oil, the court had to decide whether a later-served de-
fendant is allowed thirty days after receipt of service to join in the
37. See Brierly v. Alusiusse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 532
(6th Cir. 1999) (stating that this issue was one of first impression for the Sixth
Circuit and was one that has divided sister courts); McKinney v. Bd. of Trs.,
955 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating that "[t]here are very few re-
ported cases on point, and [that] only [the Fifth Circuit] ha[d] addressed [the]
issue"); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"[n]o appellate court has yet decided whether defendants who have waived the
right to seek removal directly are also precluded from joining in a removal pe-
tition").
38. See Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 (noting that the policy considerations of the
Fourth Circuit are equally applicable to the facts before the Sixth Circuit).
39. See Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am, 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir.
1988).
40. See Brown, 792 F.2d at 481.
41. Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988).
42. See id. at 1263.
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first-served defendants' petition for removal, or whether that later-
served defendant must join within the first served's thirty-day time
limitation.43
Plaintiffs filed an action against three separate defendants. The
first defendant, Insurance Company of North America (INA), was
served on September 3, 1986. The second defendant, Companies
Collective (CC), was served on September 5 of the same year, and
the third defendant, NL Industries, Inc. (NL), was served on Septem-
ber 24.4 On September 26, 1986, both INA and CC filed to remove
to federal court. The last-served defendant, NL, joined this petition
on October 24, 1986.45 Thus, NL joined in the removal thirty days
after it was served, but fifty-one days after thefirst defendant was of-
ficially served.46
The plaintiffs argued that the removal attempt was improper un-
der § 1446(b), since NL joined fifty-one days after the first-served
defendant.47 Plaintiffs contended that under the wording of §
1446(b), defendants only have thirty days to remove from the time
the first defendant is served. 4S Defendants argued to the contrary.
They interpreted § 1446(b) to afford a thirty-day time period from
the time each individual defendant is served, not merely the first
served in the matter.
49
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.50 It stated that "[iln
cases involving multiple defendants, the thirty-day period begins to
run as soon as thefirst defendant is served.. . ."1 The court ex-
pressed that this rule "promotes unanimity among the defendants
without placing undue hardships on subsequently served defen-
dants. 52 In addition, the court emphasized that fairness to the de-
fendants is even more protected since the later-served defendant may
43. See id. at 1262.
44. See id. at 1256.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 1262 n.11.
47. See id. at 1261.
48. See id. at 1261-62.
49. See id. at 1262.
50. See id. at 1263.
51. Id. at 1262-63 (emphasis added); see also Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792
F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying the same "first served defendant"
rationale).
52. Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1263.
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always remand the case if the first-served defendant decided to re-
move it.
53
The fact that the circuit court believed that the defendant's abil-
ity to remand was fair tends to minimize its rationale. If it is fair for
the later-served defendant to remand a case after he or she has been
brought into the suit, it would follow that a later-served defendants'
ability to remove would also promote such fairness.
Instead, the court interpreted the statute to apply only to the
first-served defendant in the matter.54 The court seemed to hide be-
hind the idea of strict statutory construction in support of its decision.
The court stated that "by restricting removal to instances in which
the statute clearly permits it, the rule is consistent with the trend to
limit removal jurisdiction and with the axiom that the removal stat-
utes are to be strictly construed against removal." 55
While strict statutory construction is always important, it should
not be cited as a rationale for promoting an illogical conclusion. The
idea of strict construction of the statute is only to insure that removal
does not frivolously occur.56 However, the congressional intent of §
1446(b) is to give adequate time for removal to defendants, and this
intent should carry a heavier weight than any idea of narrow con-
struction. 57 In truth, had the Fifth Circuit applied a strict construc-
tion of the statute, they would have never been able to add the word
"first" before "defendant."
The Fifth Circuit elaborated that this "first-served defendant
rule" allowed unanimity to prevail without burdening any later-
served defendant with undue hardship.58 That, however, is not the
case. Situations may now arise in which later-served defendants will
be forced to decide on removal without a proper amount of time to
consider it. Thus the Fifth Circuit's decision may now allow many
unjust situations to occur.
For example, suppose that a plaintiff serves defendant-one on
day one. The plaintiff then waits until day twenty-nine to serve
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 1263 n. 11 (quoting Brown, 792 F.2d at 482).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) note (1994) (1949 Act Historical and Revision
Notes).
57. Id.
58. See Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1263.
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defendant-two. While the first defendant has a full thirty days to de-
cide whether he or she wants to remove from state to federal court,
the second defendant is only afforded two days to make the same de-
cision. If defendant-two does not join the first defendant's removal
petition within those two days, his or her right to remove has been
waived, and removal to federal court has thus been thwarted. 59 The
plaintiff can therefore strategically choose to serve a second or third
defendant late within the initial defendant's thirty-day time limita-
tion, causing severe hardship to the later-served defendant's ability to
decide whether they want to remove.
When the above situation is read in light of the clear congres-
sional intent to provide "adequate time, 60 for defendants to remove,
it is clear that the Fifth Circuit's decision goes blatantly against what
Congress had intended. The idea that a statute is to be strictly con-
strued should not be used as a rationale to contravene the statute's
specific purpose.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit's analysis provides the plaintiff with a
strategic federal forum-preclusion statute to thwart a defendant's at-
tempt to remove to a federal forum if they so desire. Because later-
served defendants are stripped of their rights under this analysis, the
Fifth Circuit's ruling should not be followed by other circuits.
2. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Brown v. Demco
In Brown, decided two years before Get, Oil, the court decided
whether a later-served defendant could initiate a petition to remove
after the first-served defendant's thirty days have expired. 61 The
same policy concerns found in Getty Oil apply here.
In Brown, plaintiff Billy Brown was injured while working on
an oil rig in Louisiana.62 Brown filed the action in state court in
59. For an in-depth discussion of the inadequacies of the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation of § 1446(b), see generally Derek S. Hollingsworth, Comment,
Section 1446: Remedying the Fifth Circuit's Removal Trap, 49 BAYLOR L.
REv. 157 (1997).
60. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992); supra
notes 31-35.
61. See Brown, 792 F.2d at481.
62. See id. at 480.
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1980.63 Five years later, in 1985, Brown decided to add another de-
fendant, FMC Corporation (FMC), to the lawsuit. 64
FMC quickly petitioned to remove to federal court within thirty
days of service of process.6 The tolling time for the previously
served defendants, however, had well expired. It was far past thirty
days from the initial defendant's time of service, back in 19806 The
plaintiff then filed a motion to remand the case back to state court,
which the district court denied.67 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal,
however, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case back to
Louisiana state court.
6 8
The court's rationale centered around the rule of unanimity.
6 9
The rule of unanimity provides that "for a notice of removal to be
properly before the court, all defendants who have been served or
otherwise properly joined in the action must either join in the re-
moval, or file a written consent to the removal., 70 This rule has been
interpreted to mean different things.7' This court held that, under
this rule, a defendant who did not successfully petition within their
thirty-day time allotment has in effect "waived" their ability to join
or consent in another defendant's removal petition. 72 Thus, the ear-
lier-served defendants in this case were prevented from consenting to
FMC's petition to remove. Since FMC needed all defendants to con-
sent, their removal petition was defective, and thus could not be
granted.
63. See id.
64. See id. (FMC manufactured the specific product that caused the injury).
65. See id.
66. Seeid. at481.
67. See id. at 480.
68. See id. at 482.
69. See id. at 481-82.
70. Brierly v. Alusiusse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 n.3
(6th Cir. 1999).
71. See 14C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3732 (3d ed. 1998) (recommending that a later-served defendant
should receive thirty days to remove). But see 16 MOORE, supra note 26, 1
107.30[3] [a] (recommending that the time limit should begin to run against all
defendants from the time the first defendant is served).
72. See Brown, 792 F.2d at 481.
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Under Brown's interpretation, no defendant served thirty days
after the first defendant, without "exceptional circumstances,"
73
would be able to exercise his right to remove the case. The first-
served defendant's inability to consent under the interpretation of the
unanimity rule would prevent such removal. This analysis may pro-
mote unethical tactics by the plaintiffs. For example, under this in-
terpretation, any plaintiff can serve the defendant least likely to con-
sider removal first. The plaintiff can then wait for the thirty-day
limitation to pass, and serve the second defendant who would poten-
tially have a greater desire to remove to federal court. The plaintiffs
are thereby ensured of a state court trial resulting from a "technical-
ity.",
The decision in Brown, similar to that in Gettv Oil, strips the
rights of later-served defendants. Such an interpretation of a statute
goes against the congressional intent of the statute as well as any no-
tion of fair play.
B. A More Reasonable Inteipretation, as Provided by the
Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit was presented with the same multiple-
defendant removal issue in 1992.74 This circuit, however, realized
the unfairness of the Fifth Circuit's analysis and chose to interpret §
1446 more favorably for the defendant.7S
In McKinney v. Board of Trustees, the plaintiffs consisted of a
group of former employees of Mayland Community College.76 They
filed suit against the defendants alleging wrongful discharge from
their job positions. 77 The plaintiffs served three out of the twelve de-
fendants on April 25, 1988. 78 They served eight more defendants
73. Id. at 482. The term "exceptional circumstances" is not defined by this
court. However, a time-limit exception for later-served defendants for excep-
tional circumstances is beyond the scope of this Comment.
74. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992).
75. See id. at 928.
76. See id. at 925.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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twenty-four days later, on May 19.79 One of the later-served defen-
dants did not join in the removal until June 20.80
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case based on unti-
meliness under § 1446(b). 81 The issue in question was whether that
defendant had to file for removal by May 25-six days after person-
ally being served, but thirty days after the first defendant had been
served.
82
The district court denied the plaintiffs motion for remand.
83
The district court noted that the language of the statute did not refer
to the defendants collectively, but rather only spoke to individual de-
fendants.84 The court went on to state that Congress was "quite ca-
pable of using the plural when that is what it meant, as it did in §
1441(a)'s reference to 'the defendant or defendants'." 85 From this,
the court decided that the statute should be read as viewing "receipt
by the defendant in question., 86 While clarifying that the statute
does not refer to defendants collectively, the court also emphasized
that it would be awkward to read the statute to state "receipt by the
defendant first served, 87 as was done in Getty Oil.88 Thus, the court
decided the plaintiffs motion to remand, viewing the question in
light of the "receipt by the defendant in question" requirement, and
denied the motion.89
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 925 n.2. It is important to note that because this defendant
was served on May 19, his thirty-day time limitation would have expired on
June 18. However, this date fell on a Saturday, and thus the defendant had un-
til the following Monday, June 20, to remove.
83. See id. at 925.
84. See id. at 926.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 927; see also Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d
1253, 1263 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the thirty-day period begins to run as
soon as the first defendant is served); McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 713 F. Supp.
185, 188-89 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that the word "defendant" refers only to
notice to an individual defendant).
89. McKinney, 713 F. Supp. at 190.
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The Court of Appeals in McKinney affirmed the district court's
decision.90 They did not, however, wholly adopt the district court's
analysis. The appellate court did not agree that the inclusion of mul-
tiple defendants within the rule was clear enough to state that "Con-
gress was quite capable of using the plural when that is what it
meant." 9' Rather, they found that the language of § 1446(b) does not
answer the question presented.92
To determine the issue at hand, the court therefore correctly re-
ferred to other authority. While legislative history did not explicitly
address the question of multiple defendants being served on different
days,93 the court was willing to look to the congressional intent to
determine the rationale for § 1446(b). 94 The legislative history indi-
cated that "Congress created the removal process to protect defen-
dants. 95 For example, the court mentioned the recent amendment to
§ 1446(a) that allowed Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to now apply.96 The appellate court found this amendment to be
another indication of Congress's intent in amending the statute. The
court stated that under this new amendment, to follow the "first-
served" defendant rule would possibly subject the later defendants to
Rule 11 sanctions.97 The court further stated that "Congress surely
did not intend to impose such a Hobson's choice on later served de-
fendants." 98
The court next looked at the only applicable ease law on point.
In Getty Oil, the court ruled that strict construction of the statute in-
corporated the word "first" in front of the word "defendant" to de-
termine how the statute specifically applied.99
90. See McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928.
91. Id. at 926.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 927-28.
95. Id. at 928.
96. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 1016(b), 102 Stat. 4642,4669 (1988); McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928 (stat-
ing that if a later-served defendant is given only a few days to join in a re-
moval, the defendant would be subjecting himself to an increased risk of sanc-
tions under Rule 11).
97. See McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928.
98. Id.
99. See Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262-63.
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The court in McKinney addressed the analysis used in the Getty
Oil decision as follows:
We do not find the Getty Oil conclusion to be logical.
While the first served defendant clearly must petition for
removal within thirty days, section 1446(b) does not imply
in any way that later served defendants have less than thirty
days in which to act. Although the Getty Oil court stated
that its rule "promotes unanimity among the defendants",
"unanimity" appears to be an inappropriate word choice.
Rather, in establishing one fixed deadline for defendants
served as much as thirty days apart, a better term for what
the Getty Oil rule could lead to is "inequity." We do not
think that Congress in providing for removal to federal
court, intended to allow inequitable results. Nor do we be-
lieve that it is appropriate for a court to add a word to a
statute, as the Getty Oil opinion does by in effect inserting
"first" before the word "defendant.'
00
The court in McKinney instead held that the thirty-day time
limitation under § 1446(b) meant that each individual defendant has
thirty days from the time he or she is individually served to petition
for removal.' 0 Thus, the defendant properly joined in the removal
on June 20, within the thirty-day time limit.
In coming to this decision, the McKinney court took a much
more deliberate approach to interpreting § 1446(b). First, the court
addressed the concern that a thirty-day limitation running only from
the service of the first defendant would promote tactical service of
process by the plaintiffs.' 0 2 The court explained that
[t]he rule that the plaintiffs advance would make it possible
for a great injustice to take place .... The rights of defen-
dants ... could be ... easily overcome by tactical maneu-
vering by plaintiffs .... This cannot be what Congress had
in mind. Congress created the removal process to protect
100. McKinney, 955 F.2d at 926-27 (citation omitted) (explaining that this
Fifth Circuit case is the only persuasive authority to this court, and because the
court is not persuaded, it does not have to follow its logic and may instead look
to policy concerns).
101. See id. at 927-28.
102. See id.
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defendants. It did not extend such protection with one
hand, and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks to
overcome it. 1
3
The Fourth Circuit clearly understood the procedural trap that the
Fifth Circuit's argument would create and ruled appropriately.
C. The Sixth Circuit's Inteipretation of Tolling for
Later-Served Defendants
The Sixth Circuit was presented with the exact same issue in
Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.0 4 Paul Brierly was
killed in an explosion in defendant's packaging plant in 1993, and his
estate brought a wrongful death action in state court. -" Alusuisse
and David Ellison were named as defendants in the suit.'0 6 Alusuisse
was served on the same day the complaint was filed, but Ellison was
not served until late October, 1995.07 Alusuisse unsuccessfully tried
to remove the case within his thirty-day time limit. 1os
After being served with an amended complaint in November,
1995, Ellison attempted to remove the action to federal court, with
Alusuisse's consent, twenty days after being served.' 09 The district
court denied the motion to remand, and the decision was appealed!
The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision."'
The appellate court relied on the Fourth Circuit's ruling in
McKinney to affirm." 2 Although the facts in McKinney dealt with
the later-served defendant's joinder in a removal petition, the court
felt that the underlying policy reasons were exactly the same." 1
3
The court in Brierly focused on the Fourth Circuit's reference to
§ 1446(a)'s amendment to support its conclusion. In 1988, Congress
amended § 1446(a) to allow for removal petitions to be subject to
103. Id. (quoting the district court's wording in its opinion).
104. 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999).
105. See id. at 529.
106. See id.
107. Seeid. at531.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at536.
113. See id.
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14  The court
pointed out that in light of the amendment, the later-served defendant
must be granted thirty days from the time of summons to decide
whether or not to remove to federal court. If not given that reason-
able amount of time, later-served defendants would be forced to ei-
ther join hurriedly in the first-served defendant's petition for removal
and face Rule 11 sanctions, or forego any chance for removal.' S
The court also argued that if the plaintiff were to know early in the
proceedings whether the case will be heard in state or federal court,
they can "make sure that all defendants are served at about the same
time."' 1
6
The court in Brierly not only relied on the Fourth Circuit's co-
gent policy reasons, but also relied on strict construction of the stat-
ute itself.117 Unlike the "strict construction" applied in Getty Oil, the
court did not add any words to the statute. The court stated that to
measure tolling for removal only from the time the first defendant is
being served, one would have to voluntarily insert the word "first" in
front of "defendant" within the statute." 8 The court was unwilling to
relegislate the statute in that matter. The court explained that if Con-
gress intended for tolling to be allowed only at the onset of the first
defendant's service, it could have provided such instruction. "
9
Brierly's decision held that "as a matter of fairness to later-
served defendants," all defendants must have thirty days from the
date of their service to remove to federal court. 120 Looking strongly
toward fairness, as is seen also in the Supreme Court decision of
Murphy, the Congress's rationale, and the Fourth Circuit's prior de-
cision, Brierly correctly ruled that later-served defendants should
have the same removal tolling rights as any other defendant.
114. See id. at 533.
115. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992). For
further discussion on Rule I I's application to removal, see Hollingsworth, su-
pra note 59, at 157.
116. Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
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IV. THE CLARIFICATION BROUGHT TO § 1446(b) AND
SINGLE-DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
To understand the contention with § 1446(b) in multiple-
defendant lawsuits, it is important to first understand its implications
in single-defendant lawsuits. An inquiry into the Court's rationale
for single defendants can better explain how § 1446(b) should best
be interpreted when more than one defendant is involved, in accord
with congressional intent.
The most involved case on this issue is Murphy Bros. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc.12 1 In this case, the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed that Congress's intent was never to hold that a copy of the
initial pleading alone was sufficient to trigger a defendant's tolling
time. Service of process was still a necessary factor.122
Michetti Brothers Pipe Stringing, Inc. ("Michetti"), a Canadian
company, brought suit against Murphy Brothers ("Murphy") for
breach of contract and fraud.' 23  Michetti filed the complaint on
January 26, 1996. On January 29, the plaintiffs sent a "courtesy
copy" of the complaint to the defendant via facsimile.12 4 It was not
until February 12 that the plaintiffs were officially served with the
summons.1 5 On March 13, thirty days after the official service and
forty-four days after the "courtesy copy," defendant removed the
case to federal court. 26 Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, contend-
ing that the defendant did not remove within the thirty-day time
limitation period.
27
The district court denied plaintiffs motion to remand.'12  It
stated that official service of process was still a necessary component
to trigger the removal time limitation.129 The court held that the
phrase "receipt by defendant, through service of otherwise, of a copy
of the initial pleading settling forth the claim" within § 1446(b)
121. 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
122. See id. at 350.
123. See id. at 344.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 349.
129. See id.
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applied only to states where an action is commenced by service of a
summons, with no requirement to serve a complaint. 130 Since Ala-
bama was not a state that allowed the commencement of a lawsuit
without a copy of the complaint being served on the defendant, this
phrase had no "field of operation" in the suit.1
3'
On interlocutory appeal, however, the court reversed, and in-
structed the district court to remand the case back to state court. 32
The appellate court's rationale was much different than the rationale
of the district court. Specifically, the court held that the "clock starts
to tick upon the defendant's receipt of a copy of the filed initial
pleading" because of the wording of the statute. 33 In the words of
the appellate court, their analysis "beg[an] and end[ed] with the
words 'receipt ... or otherwise."",134 In the court's view, "the term
'receipt' is the nominal form of 'receive', which means broadly 'to
come into possession of or 'to acquire'."' 135 From this "plain mean-
ing" the court held that the interpretation of § 1446(b) does not in-
clude the service of process.'
36
Interestingly, the differing opinions between the district court
and the interlocutory appellate court represent the division among
courts over how to resolve the wording of § 1446(b) in single-
defendant lawsuits.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify
the situation. 137 The Court began its analysis by discussing the im-
portance of service of process within the judiciary. The Court em-
phasized that service of process is fundamental to any procedural
imposition by the courts.' 38 In fact, in the absence of service of pro-
cess, the court can exercise no power over that party. 139 The Court
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398
(llth Cir. 1997).
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 349.
138. See id. at 350.
139. See id.; see also Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (stating that a federal court has no personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant who has not been officially served); Miss. Publ'g Corp.
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further added that it is not possible to force a party who has not been
officially brought under the power of the court to decide whether or
not to remove a case. 4 ' As such, the Court explicitly called the
summons the "sine qua non" which requires a party to participate in
a civil action.'
4'
Thus, without service of process, a court has no power over a
person named within a lawsuit, and as such, that party cannot be
made to act within that suit. It is hardly fair that a party who is out-
side the court's jurisdiction be forced to decide whether or not to re-
move to federal court when they are not an official party in the eyes
of the court.
To make its point, the Supreme Court moved beyond the ration-
ale of procedure and into the congressional intent of § 1446(b). The
Court stated that Congress had no intent to change the traditional un-
derstanding of § 1446 with its 1949 amendment.142 The inclusion of
the phrase "or otherwise" after "service" was not placed there to
minimize the necessity of service of process. Rather, it was only in-
cluded for the benefit of those states which did not require the filing
of the complaint before the summons for the lawsuit to officially
commence.' 43 Congress felt that it was still necessary for the defen-
dant to receive some notice of the complaint before his time to re-
move the suit began to ran. 44
Since the Court found that there was no legislative intent to
abolish service of process as the trigger for tolling time, the Court
interpreted the statute to incorporate service of process as an essen-
tial element in the tolling of defendant's time to remove.1
45
Thus, the Court clarified the rationale of § 1446(b) by looking
both to the procedural rationale, as well as Congress's intent behind
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) (stating that service of summons is
the procedure required for a court to assert jurisdiction over the person of the
party served).
140. See Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 350.
141. Seeid.at351.
142. See id. at 352-53.
143. See id. at351.
144. See id. at 352 (stating that within the Senate report, Congress expressed
its concern that in such states, the defendant may not be assured access to the
complaint before being asked to act under § 1446(b)); see also S. REP. No. 81-
303, at 6 (1949).
145. See Muiplih Bros., 526 U.S. at 353.
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its amendment. Through both inquiries, the Court found that service
of process was still needed before a court could mandate a defen-
dant's petition to remove within a thirty-day limitation. The Court
completed its analysis by citing to Potter v. McCauley.146 The Court
clarified the removal statute to the extent that it explicitly writes out
the four potential situations for service of process as discussed in
Potter.1
47
Since the Court in Murphy Bros. clarified the tolling situation in
single-defendant lawsuits, this case may be used to better understand
the application of § 1446(b) to lawsuits involving multiple defen-
dants. In applying the Murphy Bros. reasoning to multiple-defendant
lawsuits, Congress's intent, which "assure[s] defendants adequate
time to remove an action to federal court,"'148 will not be misinter-
preted.
V. INCORPORATING MCKINNEY, BRIERLY, AND MURPHY
TO DETERMINE THE BEST APPROACH TO REMOVAL IN
MULTIPLE-DEFENDANT LAWSUITS
Several themes run through the above-mentioned decisions that
indicate why the Sixth Circuit's rationale is the best interpretation of
the statute. All of these cases, as well as Congress, speak to the im-
portance of statutory construction, congressional intent, and most
importantly, fairness to all parties involved.
A. Statutory Construction
Statutory construction is an issue mentioned in all the different
interpretations of § 1446. The Supreme Court has noted that the lan-
guage of any given statute is the "sole repository of congressional
intent" when the language of the statute is clear and can be inter-
preted without commanding an absurd result.149 When the language
146. 186 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D. Md. 1960).
147. See H.R. REP.No. 80-308, atAl35 (1947).
148. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S at 354.
149. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991); Free v.
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)).
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is unclear, however, or produces unjust results, courts are asked to
view the legislative history when making an interpretation.'
The Fourth Circuit's approach specifically states that
§ 1446(b)'s "statutory language by itself does not answer [the]
question ... because [it] only contemplates one defendant."' 5' Since
the language of the statute is unclear, the court instead relied on past
case law and congressional intent to determine the best interpreta-
tion. In addition, the court criticized the Fifth Circuit's interpretation
of the statute in Getty Oil, specifically its willingness to add words to
§ 1446(b).152 The court stated that it was "inappropriate" for any
court to arrive at an opinion by, in effect, inserting a word into a stat-
ute. Getty Oil should never have inserted the word "first" before
"defendant"; it goes against any idea of strict statutory construction.
Similarly, the court in Brierly did not want to contort the language of
the statute. "[A]s a matter of statutory construction, holding that the
time for removal commences for all purposes upon service of the
first defendant would require us to insert "first" before "defendant"
into the language of the statute. Furthermore, we are naturally re-
luctant to read additional words into the statute."' 53 Instead, the
court read the statute as it is written, which does not address the
problem of tolling in multiple-defendant lawsuits. The court in Bri-
erly also stated that "if Congress had intended the thirty-day removal
period to commence upon service of the first defendant, it could have
easily so provided."' 54 Both Brierly and McKinney correctly ab-
stained from adding words into a statute to facilitate a decision, and
instead relied on the actuality that the statute does not clearly address
the problem in its wording.
Clearly, this strict statutory construction demands the courts to
look more closely into congressional intent to determine the correct
interpretation. These cases all show that Congress's intent is to al-
low each defendant thirty days from the time of their individual
service of process.
150. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1992).
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th
Cir. 1999).
154. Id.
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B. Congressional Intent
Congress's main intent, as viewed through these cases, has been
to prevent the time limitation from allowing unjust results. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Getty Oil decision for one
thirty-day deadline by stating that they "do not think that Congress,
in providing for removal to federal court, intended to allow inequita-
ble results."' 55 Congress, in fact, did not intend for inequity to occur,
but instead expressed that their intent was to give an adequate time
for removal and for it to operate uniformly. 156 This is proven by
Congress's actions. It took two separate amendments to the statute
in attempts to reach such uniformity. 157 In 1948, the amendment's
purpose was to create a uniform time of removal that could be fol-
lowed by all the states.' 58
Another amendment occurred a year later specifically because
uniformity in tolling did not prevail. 5 9 The laws of some states cre-
ated a timing loophole that allowed different states' removal statutes
to have less than thirty days. Congress went to the trouble, only one
year after the first amendment, to ensure that the defendants in all
states had at least thirty days. 160 If Congress went to such trouble to
afford each defendant in different states thirty days to consider re-
moval, it clearly follows that the congressional intent for each defen-
dant within a single lawsuit was to provide the same right.
The congressional amendment to § 1446 (a), as interpreted in
both Brierly and MeKinney, also lends credence to the idea that Con-
gress intended each separate defendant to have a thirty-day tolling
period. Under this amendment, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was made applicable to § 1446.161 According to Brierly
and McKinney, this amendment by Congress suggests that there is no
way Congress intended for later-served defendants to receive a lesser
155. McKinney, 955 F.2d at 927.
156. See supra notes 30-35.
157. See supra note 31.
158. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 939, 939, amended by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (1994).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 80-308, atA135 (1947).
160. See supra notes 31-35.
161. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 1016(b), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (making improvements to the
former removal procedure).
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amount of time to remove. To do so would force that defendant,
through no fault of his or her own, to join in a first-defendant's peti-
tion, potentially before even being served, or join hurriedly after be-
ing served. Either way, that defendant may face potential Rule II
sanctions.
162
That Congress included § 1446 within the purview of Rule 11
further indicates that there was never an intent for the Fifth Circuit's
staunch approach to apply.
The analysis by the Supreme Court in Mwiphy Bros. also brings
us to the same conclusion. In Murphy Bros., the Court interpreted
the phrase "service or otherwise" found within § 1446(b).'63 The
Court had to decide whether a courtesy copy of the complaint with-
out a summons was sufficient to begin the tolling period for removal.
The Court interpreted this phrase as added by Congress for states that
did not require a filing of the complaint.164 The Court stated that
Congress simply added the wording "or otherwise" to create a uni-
form system for the tolling period.
There is nothing to make it appear that on the one hand, Con-
gress would recreate a statute twice to ensure thirty days for defen-
dants in all states, and would, on the other hand, intend for a later-
served defendant to be deprived of that same right.
C. Fairness
As seen throughout the judicial system, fairness is one of the
biggest factors in statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court in
Murphy Bros. relied on the idea of fairness to determine that a de-
fendant should be forced to consider removal before being officially
served in the lawsuit. The Court based its decision on the fact that it
is not possible to force a party, who has not officially been brought
under the power of the court, to decide whether or not to remove a
case.165 Although this decision related to single-defendant lawsuits,
the same rationale is at issue. If the Supreme Court believes that a
single defendant should not be forced to consider removal when
162. See id.; Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533; AcKinnei, 955 F.2d at 928.
163. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350
(1999).
164. See id. at 353.
165. See id. at350.
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outside the court's jurisdiction, then surely the Court would find that
a later-served defendant should also not be forced to consent or join
in the first-served defendant's notice of removal, or file her own pe-
tition for removal, before she has officially been served. The same
fairness considerations should apply. The Supreme Court's ruling in
this case clearly suggests that the Court believes each defendant is
required to have their own tolling period when considering a petition
to remove.
Courts have also addressed the unanimity rule in discussing
fairness to defendants within this process. 166 The unanimity rule
states that all defendants must join in removal or consent to removal
in order for it to be proper.167 Many courts have restricted their re-
moval opinions by an erroneous interpretation of this rule. 168 Many
districts have interpreted this rule to find that if the first defendant
does not attempt to remove within their thirty-day time period, they
have in essence waived their right to remove and thus cannot consent
to a later defendant's desire to remove. 169 This, however, is not the
result the rule was intended to produce. Rather, the rule of unanimity
only refers to the need for all defendants to unanimously agree that
removal should occur. As the court in Brierly correctly concluded:
a first-served defendant can consent to a later-served defen-
dant's removal petition, despite having already failed in its
own efforts to remove ... holding otherwise would vitiate
the removal application of the later-served defendants and
thereby nullify our holding that later-served defendants are
entitled to thirty days to remove a case.
70
The Sixth Circuit clarified the meaning of unanimity and again
stripped it of the clouded and untrue shroud that many courts have
dressed it with.
Through the rationales of fairness, congressional intent, and
statutory construction, it is clear that the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have construed the most plausible interpretation of § 1446(b). As
166. See, e.g., Brierly, 184 F.3d at 527; Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478,
478 (5th Cir. 1986).
167. See Brierly, 184 F. 3d at 533 1.3.
168. See, e.g., Brown, 792 F.2d at 478.
169. See id.
170. Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 n.3 (citations omitted).
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such, all circuits should follow this approach, and therefore allow
each defendant thirty days from the time service is effectuated upon
them, to remove to federal court. Even if the first-served defendant
did not petition for removal, or was denied removal during his or her
thirty-day limitation, the rule of unanimity does not require that the
expiration of such time precludes him or her from consenting to a
later-served defendant's removal petition.
VI. A PROPOSAL
As a result of a close introspection into these issues, a more
clear rationale emerges. In terms of § 1446(b), courts should use a
clear and uniform interpretation of the statute to attain the most eq-
uitable results. The courts thus must afford each defendant thirty
days to remove starting from the time service of process is effected
on that individual defendant. In order to work correctly, this requires
that any previously-served defendant be allowed to consent to join in
removal even after the expiration of their own thirty-day time limita-
tion. This is not to infer that these earlier-served defendants have no
time limitation for removal. Rather, once their thirty days has ex-
pired, the first-served defendants are no longer allowed to initiate a
petition for removal. The rule of unanimity thus allows defendants
to join or consent at any time another defendant is bringing suit. The
only requirement under this rule is that all defendants sign onto the
removal petition.
The application of section 1446(b) should provide defendants
with the uniform time and uniform rights that it was intended to give.
Under this construction, the congressional intent is satisfied, and
fairness to all parties involved prevails. Until the Fifth Circuit and
others follow this proposal, the courts will remain plagued by confu-
sion, inconsistency, and injustice over the proper removal procedure.
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